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NOTE
The Procedural Impact of KSR on Patent Litigation
MENG OUYANGt
INTRODUCTION
The procedural implication of the 2007 decision of the Supreme Court
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. reshapes the way trial courts
construct jury instructions in obviousness challenges. Prior to KSR,
although the question of obviousness was recognized as an issue of law, it
was largely treated as a question of fact because juries were essentially
making the legal findings of obviousness due to the practical difficulty in
separating the underlying factual determinations from the ultimate decision.
The KSR decision seems to suggest that jury interrogatories should be
submitted on specific factual questions and that the court shall make the
legal determination of obviousness. Considering the complexity of the
obviousness inquiry, special interrogatories with a general verdict appear to
be a possible solution that can implement the procedural requirement
imposed by KSR. In fact, special interrogatories not only make it easier for
juries in their deliberation by breaking the complicated obviousness
question into factual inquires, but also for judges in reviewing the jury
verdicts which become more reviewable when they are explained and
supported by the specific answers to special interrogatories. Consequently,
the use of special interrogatories can help avoid lengthy retrials and
enhance judicial consistency. Still, it is yet to be determined how courts
interpret the procedural implications of KSR and whether the Federal
Circuit is willing to provide guidance for lower courts if special
interrogatories are indeed recognized as an effective mechanism to
implement the procedural requirement.
This Note argues that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in KSR,
the use of special interrogatories in jury instructions concerning the
question of obviousness provides a solution to meet the KSR procedural
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requirement, along with other benefits in patent litigation.
Part I discusses the procedural implication of the KSR decision and its
impact on trial courts' practice in allocating the determination of the
question of obviousness. Part II examines the unreviewability of jury
verdicts in patent cases. Part III analyzes the existing mechanisms
employed by trial courts to minimize the unreviewability of jury verdicts,
presenting that the practice of special interrogatories is more favorable. Part
IV further argues that in the context of KSR, special interrogatories provide
a beneficial practice that will not only satisfy the KSR requirement in the
obviousness inquiry, but also improve certainty and uniformity in the
judicial process for the law of obviousness. Part V suggests that the Federal
Circuit has the power to provide guidance to trial courts for jury
instructions regarding the question of obviousness. However, it remains to
be seen whether the Federal Circuit is willing to assume the supervisory
role to provide such guidance. Finally, Part VI discusses the tactical
concerns for counsels following KSR.
I. THE KSR OPINION AND ITS PROCEDURAL IMPLICATION
The Supreme Court's decision in KSR is widely acknowledged as the
most significant patent case in at least a quarter century. The discussions
about KSR have been mostly focused on its substantive change to the
standard of obviousness. However, KSR may have an even greater impact
on the process the district courts should follow to decide obviousness
challenges.I
In Graham v. John Deere, the Supreme Court held that the ultimate
question whether a patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of
law. 2 The question of law for obviousness, however, "lends itself to several
basic factual inquiries." 3 Specifically, obviousness is determined based on
the scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior art and
the patent claims, and the level of ordinary skill in the relevant field.4
Secondary considerations may shed further light on the obviousness
inquiry.
5
Prior to KSR, although the question of obviousness was recognized as
a question of law and Graham sets out the factors in determining the
I See John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and
Procedure in the Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 37 (2007),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol 1 06/duffy.pdf.
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obviousness inquiry, there was no procedural guidance in Graham outlining
the specific process through which obviousness determinations are to be
made. 6 It seems logical that Graham sets out the approach where the jury
decides specific factual questions and the judge then determines the legal
question of obviousness with the jury's findings in mind.7 However, as a
practical matter, district courts typically did not proceed in this manner and
routinely relegated the question of obviousness to the jury, a practice that
the Federal Circuit affirmed. 8 One court, while recognizing that the ultimate
question as to the existence or nonexistence of obviousness is a legal
question, stated that "obviousness as an ultimate question cannot
meaningfully be separated from [the] factual determinations which are
peculiarly within the [factfinder's] province, such as the credibility of the
experts." 9 Although the Federal Circuit approved the function split of the
judge and the jury in an obviousness question,' 0 it did not mandate it and in
fact permitted district courts to submit the ultimate question of obviousness
to the jury.1" Specifically, the Federal Circuit engaged in the "teaching,
suggestion, and motivation" test for the issue of obviousness, where "the
fact finder must determine 'whether a person of ordinary skill in the art,
possessed with the understandings and knowledge reflected in the prior art,
and motivated by the general problem facing the inventor, would have been
led to make the combination recited in the claims."' 12 Therefore, juries
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See Connell v. Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("We hold that
it is not error to submit the question of obviousness to the jury."); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1339 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[Tlhe district court adopted as its own findings
the 'special verdicts' of the jury finding the [] patent was neither anticipated nor obvious...
."); Norfin, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding
that there was no error in the court's procedure where "[t]he jury decided the question of
obviousness as a question of fact, the court reserving any conclusion of validity to itself.");
Rosen v. Lawson-Hemphill, Inc., 549 F.2d 205, 209 (lst Cir. 1976) ("In this circuit, the
question of obviousness vel non is essentially one of fact ...."); see also Int'l Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 456 (Ist Cir. 1976) ("[T]his court has often stated
that the determination of obviousness, although within limits a question of law, is essentially
one of fact.").
9 Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 532 F.2d 758, 763 (1st Cir. 1976).
10 See Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(stating that with regard to a finding of obviousness in the district court, "the jury makes
written findings on each factual issue, and the court applies the law to the jury's findings").
11 SeeMcGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(overturning the district court's holding that the patent was obvious as a matter of law
because the jury's factual findings on obviousness were substantially contradictory to such a
holding).
12 NPF Ltd. v. Smart Parts, Inc., 187 F. App'x. 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); see also In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1199-1200
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("What the prior art teaches, whether it teaches away from the claimed
invention, and whether it motivates a combination of teachings from different references are
[Vol 6:2
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were essentially making the legal judgment on whether a claimed
combination would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
The KSR decision seems to suggest that permitting the jury to decide
the ultimate legal question of obviousness is wrong. In KSR, the Supreme
Court reaffirms Graham, particularly holding that "[t]he ultimate judgment
of obviousness is a legal determination." 13 In fact, the Court went further
than Graham and stated affirmatively throughout the opinion that the court
should decide obviousness issues. 14 Additionally, the Court extensively
discussed how the obviousness determination is made:
Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings
of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in
order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine
the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To
facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. See In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (C.A. Fed. 2006) ("[R]ejections on obviousness
grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead,
there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness."). 
15
Such emphasis indicates that the Supreme Court sees the issue of
whether it is obvious to combine as a decision for the judge, and a decision
that must rest on sufficient factual findings as established in Graham.
Despite the procedural change implicated in KSR, the Seventh Circuit
insists that the Supreme Court did not intend "by its statement in KSR
regarding the standard of review, to overturn the long-established practice
of having juries determine obviousness[,] particularly because the question
of who decides that point was not presented in KSR."'16 Judge Matthew F.
Kennelly of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, who
led the panel preparing the Seventh Circuit's Model Patent Jury
Instructions, believes that "[the decision of obviousness] is a jury question
unless it is appropriate for summary judgment."']7 He reasons that:
questions of fact.").
13 KSR Int'l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
14 See id. at 407,413,415, 417-18.
15 Id. at 418.
16 SEVENTH CIRCUIT MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 11.3.6 cmt. 1, at 61 (2008)
[hereinafter SEVENTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc
/4767488/CA7-pattern-patentlaw-jury-instructions-final-July-2008.
17 A Panel Discussion on Obviousness in Patent Litigation: KSR International v.
Teleflex, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 595, 625 (2007).
Spring 2009]
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[T]he Supreme Court does not try lawsuits. So when they say it is an
issue of law, that does not mean that when [a case] get[s] to a trial, the
judge is going to be deciding it, unless he decides it by a Rule 50
motion, which is the equivalent, essentially, of a summary judgment
motion in the middle of a trial. The jury is going to be making the
decision on obviousness if the case goes to trial.1
8
More specifically, Judge Kennelly does not think "anybody should draw
from KSR that we are now going to have some sort of a system where we
just give the jury a list of facts to find, and then the judge is going to make
the decision of obviousness."
19
The understanding that KSR allocates the obviousness determination
to the court because KSR involved summary judgment seems inaccurate.
20
In the KSR opinion, the Court makes it clear that the obviousness analysis is
to be employed by patent examiners as well as by courts. 2 1 Therefore,
obviousness analysis does not rest on the specific procedural context of
summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court discussed whether summary
judgment was appropriate or was precluded by disputed issues of fact, and
held it "appropriate" to invalidate the patent claim at issue on summary
judgment. 22 The separate discussion about summary judgment confirms
that the Court considers the obviousness determination as a general
proposition, and not just in the context of summary judgment.
Therefore, it can be strongly argued that KSR requires that jury
interrogatories be submitted on specific factual questions and that the
obviousness decision itself be made by the judge. 23 The approach taken by
the Northern District of California represents this view. In its Model Patent
Jury Instructions, the first alternative provides the jury with "underlying
factual questions it must answer to enable the court to make the ultimate
legal determination of the obviousness question[,]" and the second
alternative allows the jury to render an advisory verdict on the ultimate
question of obviousness. 24 Citing the Supreme Court's statement in KSR,
the Committee emphasizes in the notes of both sets of instructions that
"[t]he court, not the jury, should make the legal conclusion on the
18 Id. at 627.
19 Id. at 625.
20 See Constantine L. Trela, Jr., An Afterward To: A Panel Discussion On Obviousness
In Patent Litigation: KSR International v. Teleflex, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
633, 634 (2007).
21 See, e.g., KSR Int'l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,407, 419-21.
22 Id. at 427.
23 See supra note II and accompanying text.
24 MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
§B4.3b, 31-32 n.9-10 (2007).
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obviousness question based on underlying factual determinations made by
the jury."
25
Even though it may be clear that the jury should answer only the
Graham factual inquiries to form the background information for the
judge's ultimate legal ruling, it may be difficult in practice for a district
judge to actually construct a manageable, understandable, and useful verdict
form that clearly separates law and fact, and then to use the jury's responses
to decide the legal issue of obviousness.26 It has been suggested that there
may be other alternatives to the approach with clear function split between
judge and jury in obviousness questions.27 In fact, the Seventh Circuit's
jury instructions present an alternative after KSR by having the juries decide
the question of obviousness, which is based on the Graham factual
inquiries. 28 While the Seventh Circuit's approach eases a district judge's
task in constructing a post-KSR verdict form, it carries the danger of falling
back to the pre-KSR practice in which the determination of obviousness
issues is practically treated as an issue of fact. Therefore, in order to
effectively implement the KSR procedural requirement and to practically
draft a manageable, understandable and useful verdict form, courts should
employ some safeguards while keeping in mind the virtually unreviewable
nature of jury verdicts.
II. THE UNREVIEWABILITY OF JURY VERDICTS IN PATENT CASES
The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution preserves the right to
jury trials. 29 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has regularly
affirmed the right to jury trials in patent actions. 30 After several decades of
growth, the proportion of jury trials for patent actions has maintained at a
high level. 3 1 However, there has been "extensive scholarly debate and
increasing skepticism regarding the role of juries in patent cases."
32
25 Id. at 34 n.10.
26 See Trela, supra note 20, at 635.
27 See id. at 635.
28 SEVENTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 16, at 60.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
30 See In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc., No. 428, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
10017, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that patentee retained his right to a jury on validity
and infringement issues even if damages could not have been sought); Paltex Corp. v.
Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the Seventh Amendment
protects the right to a jury trial on issues of patent validity in patent infringement actions).
31 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
The Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 (2001). From 1968 to 1970, 2.8% of all patent
cases tried in district court were heard by juries. Id. From 1997 to 1999, 59% of all patent
cases were tried to juries. Id.
32 Id. at 365.
Spring 20091
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAWJOURNAL
Some of this skepticism has been common in civil cases: juries exhibit
certain biases in decision-making process and "are unduly swayed by
tangential factors." 33 Juries also tend to lump issues together and make
decisions on whole suits rather than analyze them individually. 34 In patent
actions, jury competency is a particular concern because most jurors do not
understand the complexity of the technology at issue to accurately apply the
law. 35 Despite these concerns about juries in patent actions, the affirmance
rate for jury verdicts and bench judgments are nearly identical at appellate
review. 36 However, appellate review of jury verdicts is less meaningful than
appellate review of judgments by the court because the standard of review
the Federal Circuit employs when reviewing jury verdicts on factual
questions is highly deferential.
37
Additionally, unlike judgments made in bench trials where the judge is
required to articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law that explain
and support his or her judgment, jury verdicts are virtually unreviewable
because of their black box nature. 38 When the jury is asked to return a
verdict on issues of mixed law and fact, it is even more difficult for an
appellate court to analyze the verdict without knowing what the jury's
factual finding was and whether the jury confused the law and fact in its
decision-making process. Nonetheless, whether or not the jury correctly
applied the law to its factual findings, the standard of review is de novo and
the trial court's decision should not be disturbed on appeal absent
prejudicial error.39 Thus, the inherent unreviewability of jury verdicts not
only jeopardizes the consistency and certainty of patent law, but also the
public interest fostered by the patent system.
Since nearly its establishment, the Federal Circuit has been keenly
aware of the problems presented by the trial of patent cases to juries by
recognizing that:
33 Id. at 368.
34 See id. at 368.
35 See id. at 369-72.
36 See id. at 368.
37 See In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The substantial evidence
standard has been analogized to the review ofjury findings, and it is generally considered to
be more deferential than the clearly erroneous standard of review.").
38 See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 719 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("Findings of fact by the jury are more difficult to set aside (being reviewed only for
reasonableness under the substantial evidence test) than those of a trial judge (to which the
clearly erroneous rule applies).").
39 Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Technicians v. Int'l
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Mach. Operators Holding Co.
902 So.2d 959, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d
1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Advanced Display Sys., Inc., v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d
1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
[Vol 6:2
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Concerns have been expressed by the patent bar that a jury trial creates a
black box into which patents are thrown and emerge intact or invalid by
an unknown and unknowable process. The trial of a patent case, in which
the judge and jury perform appropriate functions and which provides a
record that clearly delineates the basis for the decision, not only would
allay these concerns, but is also the right of litigants.
40
More specifically, it has been stated that:
When a court is presented with a naked general verdict involving mixed
issues of law and fact or the application of law to fact, an erroneous
verdict may be effectively unreviewable because it is impossible to
unscramble the issues of law from the issues of fact in order to analyze
and assess whether the decision of the jury was both legally correct and
based upon non-reversible factual findings.
41
Because of these concerns in patent cases tried by juries, when a case with
mixed issues of fact and law reaches the jury, it has been urged that courts
should "institute safeguards consistent with the Seventh Amendment to
ensure that the legal issues are determined by the court and that only triable
factual questions are determined by the jury."
42
1II. MECHANISMS TO IMPROVE THE REVIEWABILITY OF JURY VERDICTS
Special verdicts and special interrogatories accompanying general
verdicts are recognized as two mechanisms enhancing jury proceedings and
minimizing the chances of retrial. 43 As the Supreme Court stated, "[I]n
cases that reach the jury, a special verdict and/or interrogatories on each
claim element could be very useful in facilitating review, uniformity, and
possibly postverdict judgments as a matter of law. ''44 Rule 49 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the use of special verdicts and general
verdicts with special interrogatories in civil cases. 45 Rule 49(a) governs
special verdicts where a court requires a jury "to return only a special
40 Structural Rubber, 749 F.2d at 718 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
41 Brief for Matsushita Elect. Corp. of Am. and Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co., as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 21, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370 (1996) (No. 95-26).
42 Id. at 17; see Paul J. Zegger & Peter Lee, The Paper Side of Patent Jury Trials: Jury
Instructions, Special Verdict Forms, and Post-Trial Motions, 910 PLI/PAT 701, 707-08
(2007).
43 See Zegger & Lee, supra note 42, at 716.
44 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997).
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
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verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact."46 A
court may also use general verdicts with special interrogatories that require
a jury to return a general verdict with answers to written interrogatories on
specific issues of fact necessary to the verdict. 47 When a court uses special
verdicts, the judge need not and should not "give any charge about the
substantive legal rules beyond what is reasonably necessary to enable the
jury to answer intelligently the questions" given to them, which eliminates
the potentially complicated instructions of law, leaving juries to simply
answer factual questions. 48 Unlike a special verdict, in a general verdict, a
court must instruct a jury as to the relevant law and the jury must apply the
law to the facts based on their findings. 49 Both mechanisms compel a jury
to consider factual issues individually, thus improving the consistency of
jury verdicts and the underlying decision-making process. 50 The use of
special verdicts is considered a particularly useful tool in conserving
judicial resources and in effectuating the congressional policy expressed in
the patent law, because it separates the respective functions of judge and
jury and greatly simplifies the instructions given to the jury. 51 However,
when the law and fact cannot be so neatly separated and when it is
necessary and desirable for the trial judge to submit to the jury mixed
questions of law and fact, special verdicts are not so helpful as a practical
matter.
52
Additionally, because a special verdict does not ask the jury to provide
details of the specific fact-findings the jury made, courts exhibit more
favorable attitude towards special interrogatories in connection with a
general verdict in which the answers to each issue of fact are given along
with a general verdict. 53 As early as 1897, the Supreme Court recognized
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1945); see R.H. Baker &
Co. v. Smith-Blair, Inc., 331 F.2d 506, 511 (9th Cir. 1964); Krolikowski v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
283 F.2d 889, 891-92 (7th Cir. 1960).
49 FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
50 See Zegger & Lee, supra note 42, at 716.
51 See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, at 723-24 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); see generally John R. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator,
44 F.R.D. 245, 338 (1967); Samuel M. Driver, The Special Verdict-Theory and Practice,
26 WASH L.REv. 21, 21-23 (1957); Elizabeth A. Faulkner, Note, Using the Special Verdict to
Manage Complex Cases and Avoid Compromise Verdicts, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 297 (1989);
Charles T. McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2 F.R.D. 176,
181 (1941); Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the Use of Juries in
Patent Litigation (Part 11), 58 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y. 673 (1976).
52 See 9B CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2506, at 128 (3d ed. 2008).
53 See J. F. Riley, Annotation, Submission of Special Interrogatories in Connection with




the existence of the practice of special interrogatories in jury instructions,
holding that a court might require specific answers to special interrogatories
in addition to the general verdict. 54 Since the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1938, many federal trial and appellate courts have
advocated the use of special interrogatories in connection with a general
verdict in jury instructions, and have particularly recommended their use in
cases involving complicated issues in order to aid both the jury and the trial
court in applying the facts to the law, as well as the appellate courts upon
review. 55 As noted by the Fifth Circuit, special interrogatories facilitate
review because their use frees the court from having to survey every
possible basis for the jury's decision. 56 The use of special interrogatories
"may also help avoid lengthy retrials, [for example,] by demonstrating in a
particular case that implementation of the harmless error standard is
appropriate." 57 Before KSR, the Federal Circuit stated that:
The role of the trial judge in deciding upon motions for a [judgment
notwithstanding the verdict] and new trial, and that of this court on
review, are greatly facilitated when the jury has answered a series of
factual inquiries in writing. When obviousness is an issue, interrogatories
seeking answers in writing to inquiries drawn about those listed in
[Graham], insofar as the evidence adduced at trial relate to those
inquiries, should be employed .... 58
Since KSR, special interrogatories have gained more preferential attitude
54 Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 597 (1897).
55 See Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1365 (11 th Cir. 1982)
("[W]e have neither any explicit detailed fact findings nor any valid findings implicit in the
verdict and we are unable to apply the Graham test of obviousness to this patent.");
Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1982) ("While the use of special
interrogatories is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, failure to utilize this method
in a patent case places a heavy burden of convincing the reviewing court that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion."); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d
1247, 1256 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Whatever the considerations and concerns involved in
current discussions ofjuries in complex litigation, use of interrogatories and special verdicts,
from which the parties and an appellate court may glean the basis for the verdict, would
appear to alleviate at least some of those concerns in some cases."); see also Control
Components, Inc. v. Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 774 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (explaining that use of general verdicts is a "Serbonian bog that
threatens to engulf patent litigation"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1022 (1980) (dissent from
denial of rehearing en banc) (submission of obviousness to jury by general verdict is
inconsistent with Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
56 See Baumstimler, 677 F.2d at 1071-72.
57 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982)).
58 R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted).
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from the Federal Circuit. When reviewing a judgment as a matter of law,
the Federal Circuit specifically pointed out that "[w]hile a special verdict
that asks a jury whether a patent claim is obvious provides more insight
than one which simply asks whether the patent is invalid, the former still
does not provide any detail into the specific fact findings made by the
jury.
' 59
As pointed out by the courts, the use of special interrogatories in
connection with a general verdict can help both jury and judge in their
decision process. It also provides a solution that circumvents the difficult
task of having to separate law and fact in obviousness issues while it still
"accords with the inherent divisional lines between the roles of judge and
jury ....
IV. SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AND POST-KSR JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In light of KSR and the challenge courts face to implement the KSR
procedural requirement, the need to utilize special interrogatories in jury
instructions for obviousness issues intensifies. Indeed, the complexity of the
obviousness inquiry calls for the use of special interrogatories, which not
only greatly simplify the task of the jury in complicated patent cases, but
also make it possible for the trial court on motion, and for the appellate
court on appeal, to review and modify the judgment originally entered
without having to order a new trial, which without the answers to the
special interrogatories would have been necessary.
6 1
Under the approach of the Seventh Circuit's jury instructions, which
ask the jury to produce a verdict for the question of obviousness after
considering the factual inquiries, a jury is essentially given the mixed
question of fact and law and is required to enter into a general verdict for
the ultimate legal determination of obviousness.62 Even though the
instructions ask the jury to consider the underlying factual inquiries in
reaching the verdict, without the aid of special interrogatories of specific
59 Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1343 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("By
compelling a jury to consider factual issues individually, special verdicts and interrogatories
may improve the consistency of jury verdicts as well as the underlying decision-making
processes that produce them.") (citing Paul J. Zegger et al., The Paper Side of Patent Jury
Trials: Jury Instructions, Special Verdict Forms, and Post-Trial Motions, in PATENT
LITIGATION 2007 701, 716 (2007)).
60 Baumstimler, 677 F.2d at 1071.
61 See Brief of Matsushita Elect., supra note 41, at 21-22; In re Tzipori, No. 2008-1119,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22226, *23-24 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2008) ("Given the complexity of
the technological issues and the combination of multiple references used to reject claim 26, a
more comprehensive explanation of the Board's reasoning would have facilitated review...
62 SEVENTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 16, at 60.
[Vol 6:2
PA TENT LITIGATION
factual findings, a court presumes the factual findings and legal conclusion
necessary to support the verdict reached by the jury when reviewing a
general verdict. 63 Because the facts actually found by the jury are never
known outside the jury room, a jury's general verdict on obviousness can be
affirmed even when the verdict is based upon some inaccurate
understanding of legal application to the fact. Such an approach will
unavoidably result in allowing the jury to draw a legal conclusion for the
obviousness question, a situation that the KSR Court intends to prevent.
After KSR, the Federal Circuit has closely followed the Supreme
Court's guidance in treating obviousness as an issue of law. In Agrizap, Inc.
v. Woodstream Corporation, the Federal Circuit exercised due deference to
the jury's factual findings and reviewed de novo the conclusion of
obviousness. 64 The court reversed the trial court's denial of the alleged
infringer's motion for a judgment as a matter of law as to the obviousness
of the claims, because "the objective considerations of nonobviousness...
including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt
need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary
considerations that rendered the claims invalid. '65 It is in this same opinion
that the court stated that special interrogatories would have been more
desirable than special verdicts.
66
To summarize, due to the large uncertainty and the unreviewability
caused by mere general verdicts, special interrogatories will improve
certainty and uniformity in the judicial process for the law of obviousness
by allowing reviewing judges to evaluate a verdict on obviousness without
having to speculate as to what the jury may or might have concluded in the
factual findings. Special interrogatories are also more beneficial than
special verdicts in that the additional details of the jury's factual findings
connected to special interrogatories can better equip a reviewing court with
sufficient ground in rendering a ruling. For a court to exercise de novo
review authority with confidence, the facts should be as clearly expressed as
possible to permit the application of the law to those facts. In addition to
allowing for critical and meaningful review by the appellate court, special
interrogatories will also serve the purpose of "[e]xposing inaccurate jury
decision-making" which has "the advantages of directing targeted reform
63 See Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 607 (Fed. Cir.
1984), overruled on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
64 Agrizap, Inc., 520 F.3d at 1342-43.
65 Id. at 1344.
66 Agrizap, Inc., 520 F.3d at 1343 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Zegger & Lee, supra note
42, at 716 ("By compelling a jury to consider factual issues individually, special verdicts and
interrogatories may improve the consistency of jury verdicts as well as the underlying





V. FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S POTENTIAL SUPERVISORY ROLE IN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBVIOUSNESS QUESTIONS
Research prior to KSR shows that, although special verdicts or special
interrogatories appear to have been utilized in nearly every patent case, the
questions posed were generally not meaningfully drafted when the major
goal of judges and lawyers in patent cases is to simplify the case for the lay
jury. 68 While the Federal Circuit has been explicit about its preference of
meaningful special interrogatories in jury instructions, it has been reluctant
to exercise control over the use or the form of jury verdicts in patent cases:
This court recognized that administration, supervision, management,
and overseeing of the courts within a regional circuit are the sole
province of that regional circuit and its Circuit Council. Unlike those
bodies, this court is not an "administrator," "supervisor," "manager," or
"overseer" of the district courts. Hence this court said it lacked the
general authority set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 332, and that it lacked
"administrative authority," "direct supervisory authority," and "general
authority." .. . [T]his court has no congressionally granted authority to
inject itself into the business-like elements of the administration of
justice within the regional circuits.
69
However, the Supreme Court has noted otherwise when
recommending the use of special verdicts and/or special interrogatories in
patent cases, stating that "[w]ith regard to the concern over unreviewability
due to black-box jury verdicts, we offer only guidance, not a specific
mandate.... We leave it to the Federal Circuit how best to implement
procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and
reviewability to this area of law."
70
If the Federal Circuit determines that special interrogatories are the
appropriate procedural mechanism to "promote certainty, consistency, and
reviewability" in patent law, it has the authority to carry out the Supreme
Court's requirement under the choice of law rule. One commentator urged
the Federal Circuit to do so and suggested two options the Federal Circuit
may have to reform the procedural part of patent law for questions like
67 Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & A Lack of Transparency, 39 Hous. L.
REV. 779, 782 (2002).
68 Id. at 783, 786.
69 In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
70 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997).
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obviousness. 71 First, the Federal Circuit "could encourage district courts to
utilize detailed special interrogatories when deciding doctrine of equivalents
issues by holding that it is an abuse of discretion each time the court fails to
do so." 72 After cases are consistently remanded for retrial with the holding
that the general verdicts do not provide an adequate basis to review the
jury's decision, district courts will begin to use special interrogatories to
accommodate the Federal Circuit's preference.
73
The second option is based on the Federal Circuit's choice of law rule,
which states that the district court should apply the law of the regional
circuit to all procedural issues unless the procedural issue is related to
substantive matters "unique to" patent law. 74 Thus, the Federal Circuit can
require district courts to use special interrogatories in matters of procedure
that are "unique to" patent law, such as the question of obviousness, which
would never be appealed to another court, and therefore is subject only to
Federal Circuit law on the underlying substantive legal issues. 75 Hence, the
specificity of special interrogatories for obviousness inquiries would
impose minimal procedural difference on the district court.
Additionally, this approach circumvents the issue of the Federal
Circuit's supervisory authority over district courts, because the imposition
of special interrogatories does not fall within the supervisory authority,
which has been narrowly defined by the Federal Circuit to include only the
general business area of the court, such as the "'assignment of judges,
adjustment of calendars, transfer of case to another district, [or] reference to
master."' 76 Therefore, as the exclusive source of substantive patent law and
because the guidance on procedure of obviousness is minimal, the Federal
Circuit can require district courts to utilize special interrogatories
procedurally. In fact, district court judges probably will appreciate some
guidance from the Federal Circuit on the form of special interrogatories
because district court judges will be able to use the guidance to construct
jury instructions that will serve both trial courts and appellate courts'
interest when the jury verdicts are reviewed.
With its exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, the Federal Circuit
71 Moore, supra note 67, at 797-98.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 798.
75 Id. at 798 n.86 ("At least one Judge of the Federal Circuit, Paul R. Michel, has argued
that the court may be able to mandate the use of special verdict forms on the issues of
obviousness and the doctrine of equivalents in order to improve the reviewability of these
issues when appealed from a jury verdict.") (citing Paul R. Michel & Michelle Rhyu,
Improving Patent Jury Trials, 6 Fed. Cir. B.J. 89, 102-03 (1996) (discussing the possibility
of mandating special verdicts under special circumstances)).
76 See id. at 798-99 (citing In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1082 (recognizing
that this issue does not arise in cases in which the regional circuit courts have jurisdiction.))
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possesses the power to provide guidance for special interrogatories for
obviousness questions. Such supervision from the Federal Circuit will not
only benefit the district courts in managing jury instructions and reviewing
jury verdicts, but also serve the interest of promoting uniformity and
consistency in the question of obviousness in patent law. However, despite
its preference of special interrogatories, it is yet a question whether the
Federal Circuit is willing to exercise its power to provide such guidance.
VI. TACTICAL CONSIDERATION
Different from a court's point of view and goals to facilitate review,
uniformity, and postverdict judgments, submission of special interrogatories
to the jury may not be the correct approach as a strategic matter for
litigating counsels. Research shows that the shorter and more obtuse the
verdict, the easier it would be for bias and prejudice to impact the verdict.
77
Based on the suggestion of conventional wisdom and empirical research
that juries are generally pro-patentee, it is generally to the patentees' benefit
to resist requests for special interrogatories for obviousness inquiries
because it would be unlikely for the Federal Circuit to overturn a jury
verdict without details of factual inquiries in favor of the patentee. 78 In
contrast, the accused infringer would likely prefer special interrogatories, as
it is more likely that the jury's pro-patentee bias will not impact their
decision-making when they are forced to answer a series of specific factual
questions underlying the obviousness decision.
79
It still remains to be seen how district courts and the Federal Circuit
interpret KSR to impose the required obligations on the district courts and
what mechanisms they would implement to fulfill the obligations. If special
interrogatories indeed will be the approach taken to ease the issues caused
by the black-box nature of jury verdicts, counsels for patentees will have to
engage in tactics in framing the language of special interrogatories and
objecting to the language or the number of special interrogatories submitted
by the opposing counsel to counter the negative effect resulted from the
procedural impact of KSR.8°
77 See id. at 788.
78 See Laurence H. Pretty & Janene Bassett, Reconciling Section 112, Paragraph 6 with
the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Wake of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical,
489 PLI/PAT 359, at 392 (1997) ("Obviously, patentees will likely want simple
interrogatories aimed at the central issue, hoping to convince the jury that infringement has
occurred, while the accused will likely want more interrogatories in order to fragment the
issues to educate jury about the infringement analysis.").
79 See Ronald S. Longhofer, Jury Trial Techniques in Complex Civil Litigation, 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 347 (1999).




In KSR, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the question of
obviousness in patent cases is a question of law for the court. The
implicated procedural requirement calls for the use of special
interrogatories in jury instructions for obviousness. However, because
obviousness is an issue of law with underlying factual inquiries, it has
proven difficult for trial courts to separate the fact and law in constructing
jury instructions. The use of special interrogatories in connection with a
general verdict will simplify the task of the jury in complicated patent
cases, as well as improve the transparency of jury verdicts that will
facilitate review and postverdict judgment as a matter of law. Without
having to draw the line between law and fact, special interrogatories in
connection with a general verdict also ease trial courts' tasks. Ultimately,
the use of special interrogatories in the patent obviousness question will
improve certainty and uniformity in the law of obviousness.
Although it still remains to be seen how lower courts interpret the
Supreme Court's procedural requirement implicated in KSR, if the Federal
Circuit determines the use of special interrogatories is an effective
mechanism to satisfy the KSR procedural requirement and is willing to
provide guidance to trial courts, it may have two options to reform the
procedural law. It could encourage the use of special interrogatories when
deciding doctrine of equivalents issues by holding that it is an abuse of
discretion each time the district court fails to use special interrogatories. It
could also require the use of special interrogatories by district courts on the
ground that the procedure of obviousness issues are "unique to" patent law
and thus federal law applies.
For patent owners, the use of special interrogatories may negate the
benefit of a mere general verdict, the result of which tends to favor
patentees due to jury's general pro-patentee bias. When special
interrogatories are utilized, patent owners should consider other tactics such
as framing the language of special interrogatories and objecting to the
language or the number of special interrogatories submitted by the opposing
party.
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